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Court-Packing Time? Supreme Court
Legitimacy and Positivity Theory
STEPHEN M. FELDMAN†
ABSTRACT
Many progressives have decided they need to change the
Supreme Court to break the conservative justices’ lock on
judicial power. Yet those same progressives disagree about
the best way to change the Court. This Essay begins by
comparing straight-forward court-packing—adding justices
to shift the partisan balance on the Court—to other possible
Court changes, such as court-curbing measures that would
reduce the Court’s power. Court-packing has multiple
advantages over these other possibilities, not the least of
which is that even the current Roberts Court would almost
certainly hold court-packing, unlike other potential changes,
to be constitutional. Even so, some progressives view courtpacking as the most extreme or radical option. They fear that
court-packing would undermine the Court’s sociological
legitimacy: public approval and acceptance of the Court’s
authority and decisions. This Essay therefore delves deeply
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part from my forthcoming book: PACK THE COURT! A DEFENSE OF SUPREME COURT
EXPANSION (forthcoming 2021). I thank the two anonymous reviewers and Greg
Goelzhauser, all from Temple University Press, for their helpful comments on the
book manuscript.
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into a burgeoning area of political science literature on the
Court’s legitimacy: Positivity theory states that the
American people embrace the Court with a favorable bias of
good will. From this perspective, diffuse support for the
Court as an institution is resilient, even when support for
specific Court actions wavers. A handful of legal scholars
have touched on the recent research in this area, but given
our current political moment and recent Court
developments, a more comprehensive exploration of this
complicated literature seems necessary, particularly as it
bears on the possibility of court-packing. Ultimately, this
research suggests that court-packing is unlikely to weaken
the American people’s support for the Court as a judicial
institution.
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Many progressives have decided they need to change the
Supreme Court. For some, the last straw was the Merrick
Garland debacle. After Justice Antonin Scalia’s death in
February 2016, President Barack Obama nominated Judge
Garland (of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia) to fill the seat, but Senate majority
leader, Republican Mitch McConnell, with the cooperation of
all eleven Republican members of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, refused even to open hearings on Garland’s
possible confirmation.1 For other progressives, the
subsequent confirmations of Neil Gorsuch and Brett
Kavanaugh—the Kavanaugh confirmation hearings were
especially contentious—convinced them that Court change
was necessary.2 Yet, for other progressives, the Senate
Republicans’ rushed confirmation of Amy Coney Barrett
barely a week before election day in 2020 was the definitive
final step. And still other progressives found that the ongoing
deep and wide conservatism of the Court’s decisions pushed
them over the edge, despite Chief Justice Roberts occasional
feints to the middle.3
1. Ron Elving, What Happened with Merrick Garland in 2016 and Why it
Matters Now, NPR (June 29, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/
2018/06/29/624467256/what-happened-with-merrick-garland-in-2016-and-whyit-matters-now.
2. E.g., STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, THE NEW ROBERTS COURT, DONALD TRUMP,
OUR FAILING CONSTITUTION 243–44 (2017) [hereinafter FELDMAN, FAILING]
(discussing Gorsuch’s conservatism); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING BACK THE
CONSTITUTION: ACTIVIST JUDGES AND THE NEXT AGE OF AMERICAN LAW 211 (2020)
(stating that Kavanaugh’s nomination led some Democrats to conclude
something needed to be done about the Court).
AND

3. For a smattering of examples of conservative decisions, see Seila Law LLC
v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2185 (2020) (holding that a forcause limitation on the President’s power to remove the Director of the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau—CFPB—violated the separation of powers); Rucho
v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2508 (2019) (holding that political
gerrymandering was a nonjusticiable political question); Town of Greece v.
Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 570 (2014) (upholding the opening of town board
meetings with overtly sectarian Christian prayers); Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570
U.S. 529, 557 (2013) (invalidating key provision in Voting Rights Act); Citizens
United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010) (holding that
restrictions on corporate campaign spending violate free expression); Crawford v.
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While many progressives now agree that the Court must
be transformed, these same progressives have not reached a
consensus as to the appropriate change. This Essay argues
in favor of one specific approach: straight-forward courtpacking—simply adding justices to shift the partisan balance
on the Court.4 If the Democrats sweep the November 2020
elections, gaining control of both houses of Congress and the
presidency, they should add at least four justices to the
Court, increasing its size to thirteen. They should then
nominate and confirm four progressive justices. A
progressive bloc of seven justices would then control the new
Roberts Court. If the Democrats do not sweep the 2020
elections, they should pack the Court whenever they are able
to do so (assuming that, at some point in the future, they will
control Congress and the presidency).
Numerous Democrats, both moderate and more
progressive, have expressed support for court-packing. In a
celebrated amicus brief to the Supreme Court, Senator
Sheldon Whitehouse of Rhode Island and four other
Democratic senators suggested they would favor courtpacking if the Roberts Court did not change its ways.5 During
Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 204 (2008) (holding states could
constitutionally require individuals to show photo identification before voting);
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 747–48
(2007) (invalidating race-based affirmative action programs for public schools);
see also Brief of Senators Sheldon Whitehouse et al. as Amici Curiae in Support
of Respondents, New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York,
140 S. Ct. 1525 (2020) [hereinafter Brief]; FELDMAN, FAILING, supra note 2, at
173–86 (summarizing the early Roberts Court’s conservative decisions); Sheldon
Whitehouse, Conservative Judicial Activism: The Politicization of the Supreme
Court Under Chief Justice Roberts, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 195 (2015).
4. Thomas M. Keck, Court-Packing and Democratic Erosion (February 19,
2020) (available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3476889); Michael Klarman,
Why Democrats Should Pack the Supreme Court, TAKE CARE BLOG (Oct. 15, 2018),
https://takecareblog.com/blog/why-democrats-should-pack-the-supreme-court.
There are other ways to define court-packing. E.g., David Kosař & Katarína
Šipulová, How to Fight Court-Packing?, 6 CONST. STUD. 133, 135 (2020).
5. Brief, supra note 3, at 17–18; see also Ian Millhiser, Five Democratic
Senators Just Declared All-Out War on the Supreme Court, THINKPROGRESS (Aug.
15, 2019, 10:48 AM), https://archive.thinkprogress.org/five-democraticsenators-just-declared-all-out-war-on-the-supreme-court-7601fed719e6/.
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the 2019 presidential campaign season (leading up to the
2020 election), at least two Democratic hopefuls, Senators
Elizabeth Warren and Kamala Harris, supported the
possibility of court-packing.6 And former Attorney General
Eric Holder recommended that Democrats “should consider
expanding the Supreme Court.”7 To be sure, other Democrats
then campaigning for the presidential nomination (as well as
some
progressive
commentators)
remained
more
circumspect. They acknowledged that something must be
done about the Court, but please, “No court-packing”; it is too
extreme or radical.8 Pete Buttigieg and Beto O’Rourke
supported adding justices but only in a stylized fashion that
would supposedly “de-politicize” the Court,9 while Senator
Bernie Sanders suggested that the current justices could be

Senator Whitehouse had previously criticized the Roberts Court for politicizing
adjudication. Whitehouse, supra note 3.
6. Rashaan Ayesh, Court Packing: Where the 2020 Candidates Stand, AXIOS
(Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.axios.com/court-packing-where-2020-candidatesstand-aff0e431-7624-42f0-b37f-a9091d1652f9.html; Kevin Uhrmacher et al.,
Would You Support Adding Justices to ‘Pack’ the Supreme Court?, WASH. POST:
WHERE DEMOCRATS STAND, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/
policy-2020/voting-changes/supreme-court-packing/ (last updated Apr. 8, 2020).
7. Russell Wheeler, Pack the Court? Putting a Popular Imprint on the
Federal Judiciary, BROOKINGS (Apr. 3, 2019) (quoting Holder); Michael Scherer,
‘Court Packing’ Ideas Get Attention from Democrats, WASH. POST (Mar. 11, 2019)
(discussing Holder).
8. For commentators discussing court-packing, for and against, see
Jonathan Bernstein, Don’t Pack the Supreme Court. Fix It., BLOOMBERG (Sept. 18,
2019,
6:30
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-09-18/
democrats-shouldn-t-pack-the-supreme-court-they-should-fix-it; Jamelle Bouie,
Mad About Kavanaugh and Gorsuch? The Best Way to Get Even is to Pack the
Court, NY TIMES (Sept. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/17/
opinion/kavanaugh-trump-packing-court.html; Larry Diamond, Don’t Mess With
the
Supreme
Court,
THE
HILL
(May
20,
2020,
4:30
PM),
https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/498707-dont-mess-with-the-supreme-court;
Mondaire Jones, To Save Our Democracy, We Must Expand the Supreme Court,
SALON (Apr. 26, 2020, 4:00 PM), https://www.salon.com/2020/04/26/to-save-ourdemocracy-we-must-expand-the-supreme-court/; Kevin D. Williamson, The
Partisan Majoritarianism of Jamelle Bouie’s Court-Packing Argument, NATIONAL
REVIEW: THE CORNER (Sept. 17, 2019, 10:55 AM), https://www.national
review.com/corner/civic-miseducation-from-the-new-york-times/.
9. Ayesh, supra note 6.
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demoted to lower federal courts.10 Most important, the
Democratic nominee, Joe Biden, opposed court-packing
(more on that in the conclusion).11
One key criticism of court-packing is that it will
undermine the Court’s “sociological legitimacy”: public
approval and acceptance of the Court’s authority and
decisions.12 The people must, as a matter of fact, respect and
10. Ian Millhiser, Bernie Sanders’s Radical Plan to Fix the Supreme Court,
VOX (Feb. 11, 2020, 8:10 AM), https://www.vox.com/2020/2/11/21131583/berniesanders-supreme-court-rotation-lottery.
11. Adam Shaw, Biden Bucks Dem 2020 Field on Court Packing,
Decriminalizing
Border
Crossings,
FOX
NEWS
(July
6,
2019),
https://www.foxnews.com/politics/biden-bucks-dem-field-on-court-packingdecriminalizing-border-crossings. Julian Castro was another Democratic
candidate opposing court-packing. Uhrmacher, supra note 6.
12. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT 21–
24 (2018). Political scientists have extensively studied the Court’s legitimacy,
though their various conclusions sometimes do not harmonize with each other. I
will draw on the following sources: BRANDON L. BARTELS & CHRISTOPHER D.
JOHNSTON, CURBING THE COURT: WHY THE PUBLIC CONSTRAINS JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE (2020); TOM S. CLARK, THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
(2010); JAMES L. GIBSON & GREGORY A. CALDEIRA, CITIZENS, COURTS, AND
CONFIRMATIONS: POSITIVITY THEORY AND THE JUDGMENTS OF THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE (2009) [hereinafter GIBSON & CALDEIRA, CITIZENS]; Alex Badas, Policy
Disagreement and Judicial Legitimacy: Evidence from the 1937 Court-Packing
Plan, 48 J. LEGAL STUD. 377 (2019); Brandon L. Bartels & Christopher D.
Johnston, On the Ideological Foundations of Supreme Court Legitimacy in the
American Public, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 184 (2013); Gregory A. Caldeira & James L.
Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme Court, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI.
635 (1992) [hereinafter Caldeira & Gibson, Etiology]; Dino P. Christenson &
David M. Glick, Chief Justice Roberts’s Health Care Decision Disrobed: The
Microfoundations of the Supreme Court’s Legitimacy, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 403
(2015); Tom S. Clark & Jonathan P. Kastellec, Source Cues and Public Support
for the Supreme Court, 43 AM. POL. RES. 504 (2015); James L. Gibson & Gregory
A. Caldeira, Blacks and the United States Supreme Court: Models of Diffuse
Support, 54 J. POL. 1120 (1992) [hereinafter Gibson & Caldeira, Blacks]; James
L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Has Legal Realism Damaged the Legitimacy of
the U.S. Supreme Court?, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 195 (2011) [hereinafter Gibson &
Caldeira, Realism]; James L. Gibson & Michael J. Nelson, Reconsidering
Positivity Theory: What Roles do Politicization, Ideological Disagreement, and
Legal Realism Play in Shaping U.S. Supreme Court Legitimacy?, 14 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 592 (2017) [hereinafter Gibson & Nelson, Reconsidering]; James L.
Gibson & Michael J. Nelson. Is the U.S. Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Grounded
in Performance Satisfaction and Ideology?, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 162 (2015)
[hereinafter Gibson & Nelson, Legitimacy]; James L Gibson et al., On the
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obey the Court’s decisions, or the Court will no longer be able
to fulfill its function within the American constitutional
system. Regardless of the historical and analytical
justifications that might be offered in support of courtpacking, Democratic court-packing would be ill-advised if it
would cause the American people to lose faith in the Court
as a judicial institution. Hence, the more precise goal of this
Essay: to defend court-packing against the charge that it
would seriously impair the Court’s sociological legitimacy. To
be sure, I will touch on other reasons to support courtpacking—for instance, court-packing has advantages over
other
potential
Supreme
Court
changes—yet
a
comprehensive defense of court-packing is beyond the scope
of this Essay. Such a full defense would require a book.13
A premise of this argument is that law and politics
dynamically interact in Supreme Court decision-making.14
In most cases, the justices sincerely interpret the relevant
legal texts—the Constitution, statutes, executive orders, and
so on—but interpretation is never mechanical. No
algorithmic method reveals the correct meaning of the text.15
Constitutional interpretation, in particular, is never merely
two plus two equals four. Instead, the justices’ political
preferences always influence their interpretations of the
Constitution and other texts, so law and politics always
intertwine in the adjudicative process.16 If politics writ large
Legitimacy of National High Courts, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 343 (1998); Colin
Glennon & Logan Strother, The Maintenance of Institutional Legitimacy in
Supreme Court Justices’ Public Rhetoric, 7 J.L. AND CTS. 241 (2019).
13. STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, PACK THE COURT! A DEFENSE OF SUPREME COURT
EXPANSION (forthcoming 2021) [hereinafter PACK THE COURT].
14. Stephen M. Feldman, Fighting the Tofu: Law and Politics in Scholarship
and Adjudication, 14 CARDOZO PUB. L., POL’Y & ETHICS J. 91, 91 (2015); Stephen
M. Feldman, Supreme Court Alchemy: Turning Law and Politics Into
Mayonnaise, 12 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 57, 69–70 (2014).
15. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 295, 309, 365 (Joel
Weinsheimer & Donald Marshall trans., 2d revised ed. 2004); Ronald Dworkin,
How Law is Like Literature, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 146, 160 (1985).
16. TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 219 (“Everyone ought to agree that decisions on
highly contentious matters blend law and politics.”); Gibson & Caldeira, Realism,
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is the purposeful and overt pursuit of political goals—think
of members of Congress trying to enact a statute—then
Supreme Court decision-making is typically politics writ
small. Politics shapes the justices’ interpretive conclusions
even though the justices focus on the law. Politics writ small
inheres in legal interpretation, or to put it conversely, legal
interpretation is politics writ small. Unsurprisingly, then,
the justices’ legal interpretations and judicial conclusions
ordinarily coincide with their respective political
preferences.17
Unquestionably, many judges, legal scholars, and other
Americans still believe in a law-politics dichotomy—the idea
that law and politics must remain separate and
independent—rather than a law-politics dynamic.18 From
supra note 12, at 196 (“[N]o serious analyst would today contend that the
decisions of the justices of the Supreme Court are independent of the personal
ideologies of the judges. In this sense, legal realism has carried the day.”). Thus,
the approach, accepted in this Essay—that the Supreme Court decides pursuant
to a law-politics dynamic—rejects the attitudinal model of political science, which
posits that in most cases politics alone determines Supreme Court outcomes. See
JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993); JEFFREY A. SEGAL ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT IN THE
AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 38, 39 (2005). A growing number of political scientists
and legal scholars now recognize that law and politics mix in Supreme Court
adjudication. E.g., CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, COURTING PERIL 8 (2016); Frank B.
Cross & Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on Supreme Court
Decisionmaking, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1437, 1443–45 (2001). See generally MICHAEL
A. BAILEY & FORREST MALTZMAN, THE CONSTRAINED COURT: LAW, POLITICS, AND
THE DECISIONS JUSTICES MAKE (2011); LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE AMERICAN ELITE, 1789-2008 (2009); Lawrence Baum, Law and Policy:
More and Less Than a Dichotomy, in WHAT’S LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT? 71 (Charles
Gardner Geyh ed., 2011); Howard Gillman, What’s Law Got to Do With It?
Judicial Behavioralists Test the ‘Legal Model’ of Judicial Decision Making, 26 L.
& SOC. INQUIRY 465 (2001).
17. Certainly, some Supreme Court decisions appear to be more politics writ
large than writ small. The standard example is Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000),
which decided the 2000 presidential election. HOWARD GILLMAN, THE VOTES THAT
COUNTED: HOW THE COURT DECIDED THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 2–5, 141–
43, 185–89 (2001); Michael J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of
Constitutional History, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1721, 1725 (2001); Cass R. Sunstein,
Order Without Law, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 757, 759 (2001).
18. Originalists insist that their interpretive method produces purely legal
conclusions and removes politics from adjudication. ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING
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this more traditional vantage, the justices must decide cases
by neutrally applying the rule of law. Politics is a disease
that threatens the health of the judicial process.19 If politics
infects a Supreme Court case, then the decision is tainted.20
Even so, an increasing number of legal scholars and political
scientists have repudiated the law-politics dichotomy and

AMERICA 5–6, 143–44 (1990); Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for
Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611 (1999); Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman,
Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 Const. Comment 47 (2006); see John O.
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory
of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751
(2009).
OF

19. Therefore, regardless of public perceptions of the Court, many
commentators worry that court-packing will politicize the Court—by
undermining the law-politics dichotomy—and therefore destroy the Court’s
legitimacy (this legitimacy is legal or moral rather than sociological). See FALLON,
supra note 12, at 22–24. Unsurprisingly, then, some Democrats nowadays worry
that if they seize an opportunity to pack the Court, the Republicans will respond
tit-for-tat, re-packing the Court with new conservative justices when they get the
opportunity; once the Court is politicized, there will be no going back. See Daniel
Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman, How to Save the Supreme Court, 129 YALE L.J. 148,
172 (2019); David E. Pozen, Hardball and/as Anti-Hardball, 21 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS.
& PUB. POL’Y 949, 950 (2019); Mark Tushnet, The Pirate’s Code: Constitutional
Conventions in U.S. Constitutional Law, 45 PEPP. L. REV. 481, 499–502 (2018)
(questioning the tit-for-tat reasoning). Joe Biden has opposed court-packing
partly because of a concern that Republicans will respond in kind. Jordain
Carney, Democrats Warn Biden Against Releasing SCOTUS List, THE HILL (June
12, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://thehillcom/homenews/senate/502380-democratswarn-biden-against-releasing-scotus-list. Bernie Sanders worried about the
Republicans responding to Democratic court-packing tit-for-tat and
delegitimizing the Court. Millhiser, supra note 10. Notice that if the Court
decides cases pursuant to a law-politics dynamic—and the law-politics dichotomy
is a myth—then the worry that court-packing will politicize the Court’s decisionmaking process is misplaced.
20. Chief Justice Roberts, for instance, recently reiterated the law-politics
dichotomy: “We will continue to decide cases according to the Constitution and
laws without fear or favor. That’s necessary to avoid the politicization of the
Court.” His message was unambiguous: Politics corrupts adjudication, and the
justices will have none of it. Ariane de Vogue, John Roberts Says Supreme Court
Doesn’t Work in a ‘Political Manner,’ CNN POLITICS (Sept. 24, 2019, 10:51 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/24/politics/john-roberts-new-york/index.html;
Richard Wolf, His Supreme Court Divided Like the Country, Chief Justice John
Roberts Prepares for Outsized Role as Umpire, USA TODAY (Sept. 25, 2019, 5:00
AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/09/25/chief-justicejohn-roberts-straddles-supreme-courts-left-and-right/2422156001/.
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have subscribed to some notion of a law-politics dynamic.21
They view the notion that the Court decides cases pursuant
to pure law, bereft of politics, as a myth. Crucially, though,
the reality of the law-politics dynamic in Supreme Court
decision making does not lessen concerns about the Court’s
sociological legitimacy. In other words, court-packing might
still undermine the public’s faith in the Court, even if the
law-politics dichotomy is a myth.
Given the law-politics dynamic, we can readily
understand why the Roberts Court consistently hands down
conservative decisions.22 Political science empirical studies
underscore the political tilt of the Court. Ever since the
conservative Clarence Thomas replaced the liberal Thurgood
Marshall in 1991, conservative blocs of justices have
controlled the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts.23 These
conservative justices have interpreted (and continue to
interpret) the Constitution and other legal texts from within
their conservative political horizons. Therefore, corporations
and the wealthy usually win; the poor might not even get into

21. See supra text accompanying note 16 (giving examples of political
scientists and legal scholars who accept some form of a law-politics dynamic).
22. Brief, supra note 3, at 12 (“With bare partisan majorities, the Court has
influenced sensitive areas like voting rights, partisan gerrymandering, dark
money, union power, regulation of pollution, corporate liability, and access to
federal court, particularly regarding civil rights and discrimination in the
workplace. Every single time, the corporate and Republican political interests
prevailed.”).
23. For rankings of Supreme Court justices based on political ideology, see
LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES 106–16 (2013) (listing and
explaining rankings of Supreme Court justices based on political ideology
including Martin-Quinn scores (accounting for changes over time) and SegalCover scores (quantifying Court nominees’ perceived political ideologies at the
time of appointment)); Lee Epstein et al., How Business Fares in the Supreme
Court, 97 MINN. L REV. 1431, 1431–32 (2013).
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court.24 Employers win; unions and employees lose.25 Whites
win; people of color lose.26 Men win; women lose.27 Christians
win; non-Christians lose.28 Republicans with entrenched
political power win; Democratic voters lose.29 Gun owners

24. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 570 U.S. 350, 370 (2015) (holding that
government restriction on the sale of raisins, based on a 1937 statute, was a
taking and required just compensation); Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27,
38 (2013) (interpreting Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to limit class actions
against corporation); Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011)
(invalidating state law restricting corporate sale of medical data); Citizens
United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010) (invalidating
restriction on corporate campaign expenditures); Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,
554 U.S. 471, 515 (2008) (limiting punitive damage awards against corporations);
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 642–43 (2007) (imposing
restrictive time bar for employment discrimination lawsuits against
corporations).
25. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct.
2448, 2486 (2018) (holding that workers cannot be forced to pay union fees related
solely to collective bargaining representation even though the workers benefit
from the representation); Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, 567 U.S. 298, 322
(2012) (holding that public employee union could not impose a special assessment
fee to support political advocacy even if union members could opt out); Borough
of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 399 (2011) (limiting government employee’s
First-Amendment right to petition the government); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547
U.S. 410, 426 (2006) (limiting free-speech rights of government employees by
distinguishing between speech as a citizen and speech as an employee).
26. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
730 (2007) (invalidating race-based affirmative action programs).
27. June Med. Servs., LLC v. Gee, 139 S. Ct. 663, 662 (2019) (mem)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (Kavanaugh, Gorsuch, Thomas, and Alito voted to
deny a stay of an admitting-privileges statute that would force the closure of
abortion facilities); Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 642–43 (2007) (holding that woman’s
sex discrimination claim under Title VII was time barred).
28. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2074 (2019) (public
display of 32-foot Christian cross is constitutional); Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct.
2392, 2423 (2018) (upholding travel ban primarily targeting Muslims);
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719,
1747–48 (2018) (protecting Christian baker from anti-discrimination statute
after he refused to bake a cake for a same-sex couple); Pleasant Grove City v.
Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 481 (2009) (allowing city to refuse to display a minorityreligion monument when already displaying the Ten Commandments).
29. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2508 (2019) (refusing to
invalidate extreme partisan gerrymandering); Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305,
2335 (2018) (upholding Texas voting restrictions).
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win; everybody else loses.30
If the Democrats were to gain control of both houses of
Congress and the presidency in 2021 or later, they would
undoubtedly begin enacting statutes implementing a
progressive agenda. They might pass laws creating universal
health care, strengthening environmental protections and
fighting climate change, combatting structural and
unconscious racism, protecting public health from pandemics
(like the novel coronavirus), restricting gun ownership,
restoring and fortifying voting rights, and protecting
documented and undocumented immigrants.31 The Roberts
Court, with its current personnel, could invoke and construct
constitutional barriers that would threaten all of these
laws.32 In the fall of 2019, conservative political
commentators began laying the seeds for such a judicial
backlash, arguing that Elizabeth Warren’s progressive
agenda, for example, showed “open contempt for legal and
constitutional boundaries.”33
30. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010) (applying SecondAmendment protections against state and local governments); District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (holding that the Second
Amendment protects an individual right to own firearms).
31. The Democrats might need to eliminate the Senate cloture (or filibuster)
rule to facilitate enactment of progressive legislation. Molly E. Reynolds, What is
the Senate Filibuster, and What Would it Take to Eliminate It? BROOKINGS:
POLICY 2020 (Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/policy2020/votervital/
what-is-the-senate-filibuster-and-what-would-it-take-to-eliminate-it/. While Joe
Biden has previously expressed support for the filibuster, he recently suggested
being open to eliminating it. Max Cohen, Biden Signals Openness to Eliminating
Senate Filibuster, POLITICO (July 14, 2020, 10:28 AM), https://www.politco.com/
news/2020/07/14/joe-biden-2020-filibuster-360587.
32. For progressives worrying about the Roberts Court, see Klarman, supra
note 4; SAMUEL MOYN & AARON BELKIN, THE ROBERTS COURT WOULD LIKELY
STRIKE DOWN CLIMATE CHANGE LEGISLATION 2 (2019).
33. Rich Lowry, Elizabeth Warren’s Threat to the Constitution, NATIONAL
REVIEW (Oct. 11, 2019, 6:30 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/10/
elizabeth-warren-shows-contempt-for-legal-constitutional-boundaries/. In
a
recent decision, Justice Alito expressed a desire to resurrect the non-delegation
doctrine as a means of limiting congressional power, even though the Court had
not invoked the doctrine since 1935. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116,
2130–31 (2019) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
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Yet, with control of both houses of Congress and the
presidency, the Democrats could also enact a court-packing
statute, adding at least four justices to the Supreme Court.
Part I of this Essay compares court-packing to other possible
Court changes, such as court-curbing measures that would
reduce the Court’s power. Court-packing has multiple
advantages over these other possibilities, especially from a
progressive standpoint. One of the advantages is that even
the current Roberts Court would almost certainly hold courtpacking, unlike other potential changes, to be constitutional.
Part II focuses on the key criticism of court-packing, that
it would undermine the Court’s sociological legitimacy. A
central purpose of this Essay is to delve deeply into a
burgeoning political science literature on the Court’s
legitimacy. According to positivity theory, the American
people embrace the Court with a favorable bias of good will.
Diffuse support for the Court as an institution is therefore
resilient, even when support for specific Court actions
wavers.34 A handful of legal scholars have touched on the
recent research in this area,35 but given our current political
moment and recent Court developments, a more
comprehensive exploration of this complicated literature
seems necessary, particularly as it bears on the possibility of
court-packing. Ultimately, this research suggests that courtpacking is unlikely to weaken the American people’s overall
support for the Court. The Essay ends with a brief
conclusion.
A caveat about the politics of this Essay might be helpful
at the outset. The Essay focuses on defending court-packing,
in our current political and judicial environment, from one
important objection. Namely, the Essay argues that
34. GIBSON & CALDEIRA, CITIZENS, supra note 12, at 3, 39; Gibson & Nelson,
Reconsidering, supra note 12, at 595.
35. E.g., FALLON, supra note 12, at 21–23; TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 219–21;
Tara Leigh Grove, The Origins (and Fragility) of Judicial Independence, 71 VAND.
L. REV. 465, 505–45 (2018) [hereinafter Grove, Origins]. See generally Tara Leigh
Grove, The Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Dilemma, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2240 (2019).
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Democratic court-packing will not undermine the Court’s
sociological legitimacy. In theory, the argument could of
course be turned around to support Republican courtpacking in some hypothetical future world. But that
hypothetical world does not currently exist. As will be
mentioned in Part II, no specific set of criteria must be
satisfied to justify court-packing. Rather, the determination
must and will be made politically, and the Court itself
necessarily plays a significant role in that political
determination. In short, court-packing and the Court’s
legitimacy necessarily revolve around politics, and the
politics of the current moment augur favorably for
Democratic court-packing. Conjecturing about whether
Republicans could justifiably pack the Court in some
indeterminate future—without undermining the people’s
diffuse support for the Court—would venture beyond this
Essay into the world of fiction.36

36. For a discussion of whether the Republicans might respond tit-for-tat to
Democratic court-packing, see infra note 111. For a fuller explanation of the
politics justifying Democratic court-packing in our current environment, see
PACK THE COURT, supra note 13.
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COURT-PACKING COMPARED TO OTHER POSSIBLE
SUPREME COURT CHANGES

Progressive commentators have proposed numerous
potential changes to the Court. One possibility is straightforward court-packing: simply adding justices to shift the
partisan balance on the Court.37 But there have been other
proposals, which fall into two general categories. First,
dozens of times throughout American history, Congress has
attempted to limit or reduce the scope of the Court’s power.
The specifics of these court-curbing efforts typically reflected
the particular contemporary political disputes. For instance,
during the Progressive era of the early-twentieth century,
Congress considered a bill that would have required at least
a two-thirds majority of the justices to invalidate
congressional (presumably Progressive) legislation.38 More
frequently, Congress has considered bills that would carve
away part of the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction—for all
cases involving abortion, to take one example, or for all cases
involving national security, to take another.39 If these courtcurbing bills had been enacted into law, then the Court
would have been precluded from hearing and deciding cases
in the designated areas. The most extreme of these proposals
would completely remove the Court’s power to decide
constitutional issues.40

37. Klarman, supra note 4. See generally Keck, supra note 4.
38. Stephen E. Sachs suggests some limit on the Court to this effect when he
writes: “[W]e should precommit to limiting the Court’s freedom of action, binding
it to some discrete set of preexisting rules until there is a very broad consensus
for changing them.” Stephen E. Sachs, Supreme Court as Superweapon: A
Response to Epps & Sitaraman, 129 YALE L.J. FORUM 93, 107 (2019).
39. STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A
HISTORY 448–49 (2008) [hereinafter FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION] (jurisdictionstripping bills focused on national security during Red Scare); Clark, supra note
12, at 36–42 (types of court-curbing); Shelden D. Elliott, Court-Curbing Proposals
in Congress, 33 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 597 (1958); Stuart S. Nagel, Court-Curbing
Periods in American History, 18 VAND. L. REV. 925 (1965).
40. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING
(1999).
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Second, particularly in recent years, commentators have
suggested changes to the Court’s size and makeup that
would ostensibly “save” or “preserve” the Court’s
institutional role as an apolitical, “nonpartisan,” or “neutral”
judicial decision maker.41 These proposals can be subdivided
into two basic types. First, some recommend term limits for
the Supreme Court justices. While the specifics can vary, the
typical proposal suggests staggered eighteen-year terms so
that each president appoints a justice every two years.42
Second, several commentators propose expanding the
number of justices in some stylized fashion so the expansion
does not amount to straight-forward court-packing. For
instance, Tracey George and Chris Guthrie recommend
increasing the Supreme Court to fifteen justices who would
function more like judges on a federal Circuit Court of
Appeals. In other words, randomly selected panels of three
justices would decide most cases, while all the justices sitting
en banc would decide the unusual or special case.43 Daniel
Epps and Ganesh Sitaraman have developed two alternative
schemes also based on a stylized Court expansion. One they
call the “Supreme Court Lottery”44: Every judge currently on
a federal Circuit Court of Appeals would literally become a
Supreme Court justice (there are currently 179 circuit court
41. Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 19, at 151–52.
42. See Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington, The Supreme Court Renewal
Act: A Return to Basic Principles, in REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 467, 467–70 (Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington
eds., 2006); Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme
Court: Life Tenure Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 769, 822–30 (2006);
Roger C. Cramton, Reforming the Supreme Court, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1313, 1323–
24 (2007); Pozen, supra note 19, at 951–52.
43. Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, Remaking the United States Supreme
Court in the Courts’ of Appeals Image, 58 DUKE L.J. 1439, 1457–58, 1465–66
(2009). See also Jonathan Turley, Unpacking the Court: The Case for the
Expansion of the United States Supreme Court in the Twenty-First Century, 33
PERSP. ON POL. SCI. 155, 155–56 (2004) (recommending Court expansion).
44. Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 19, at 181–82 (adding another
requirement: “only a 6-3 supermajority of the Court, rather than a simple
majority, could hold a federal statute (and possibly state statutes, depending on
how one weighs federalism values) unconstitutional.”).
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judges). Out of this pool, random panels of nine would decide
cases. Panels, though, would be politically restricted: “each
panel would be prohibited from having more than five
Justices nominated by a President of a single political party
(that is, no more than five Republicans or Democrats at a
time).”45 The second scheme they call the “Balanced Bench.”
It would increase the Court to fifteen justices, including five
Republicans and five Democrats. “These ten Justices would
then select five additional Justices chosen from current
circuit (or possibly district) court judges. The catch? The ten
partisan-affiliated Justices would need to select the
additional five Justices unanimously (or at least by a strong
supermajority requirement).”46
Putting aside straight-forward court-packing, all of these
proposed changes to the Court—whether a court-curbing
measure, an imposition of term limits, or a stylized
expansion—are problematic. Most if not all of them are of
questionable constitutionality.47 Epps and Sitaraman admit
that even their own proposals, the Supreme Court Lottery
and the Balanced Bench, might be unconstitutional.48 Given
this, one might expect the Roberts Court to invalidate any
enacted change: After all, these proposals would diminish
the power of either the current justices or the Court as a
whole. The Roberts and Rehnquist Courts have been, on the
one hand, wary of congressional enactments and, on the
other hand, protective of judicial power, so the justices would
likely be hostile to any congressional tampering with the
45. Id. at 182.
46. Id. at 193. Among the Democrats campaigning for president in 2019, Pete
Buttigieg and Beto O’Rourke seemed to support the Balanced Bench approach,
David A. Graham, The Democrats Discover the Supreme Court, THE ATLANTIC
(June 4, 2019) https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/06/buttigiegssupreme-court-plan-and-democratic-party/590905/. One article suggested Bernie
Sanders might consider something like the Supreme Court Lottery. Millhiser,
supra note 10.
47. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
162–81 (6th ed. 2019); DAVID O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER 357–65 (12th ed. 2020).
48. Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 19, at 185–92, 200–05.
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Court itself.49 Some of the proposals have problems unique
to them. For example, any court-curbing reduction of the
Court’s subject matter jurisdiction would only dent the
Court’s power. If Congress were to attempt to eliminate the
Court’s power to adjudicate the constitutionality of racebased affirmative action programs, to take one illustration,
the Court would still be empowered to protect the wealthy
and the economic marketplace, to protect mainstream
Christians rather than religious minorities, and to protect
men but not women. Historically, such court-curbing
measures have rarely been enacted and have achieved only
“relative success”—with that limited success typically
arising only because one or more justices shifted their
judicial positions in response to the court-curbing threat.50
In the words of political scientist David O’Brien, if Congress
seeks to control a recalcitrant Court, “[c]ourt-curbing
legislation is not a very effective weapon.”51 To be sure, in
these highly polarized times, we cannot reasonably
anticipate a court-curbing threat to induce one of the
conservative justices to shift leftward—whether Chief
49. For cases showing the Court’s protectiveness toward judicial as opposed
to congressional power, see Trump v. Mazars, 140 S. Ct. 2019 (2020) (remanding
the House of Representatives’ demand for Trump’s income tax returns while
constraining congressional reach); Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020)
(remanding New York prosecutorial demand for Trump’s income tax returns but
recognizing grand jury’s power to demand the returns); Boumediene v. Bush, 553
U.S. 723 (2008) (invalidating congressional act stripping habeas corpus
jurisdiction from the federal courts for enemy combatants); Clinton v. Jones, 520
U.S. 681 (1997) (holding that president is not immune to lawsuits for conduct
prior to becoming president); see also THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST
SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY 2 (2004); O’Brien, supra note 47, at 30–32; Lee
Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Is the Roberts Court Especially Activist? A Study of
Invalidating (and Upholding) Federal, State, and Local Laws, 61 EMORY L.J. 737
(2012). Thomas M. Keck, Party, Policy, or Duty: Why Does the Supreme Court
Invalidate Federal Statutes?, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 321, 325 (2007) (compiling a
list of federal statutes invalidated by the Court from 1981 to 2013); Keith E.
Whittington, The Least Activist Supreme Court in History? The Roberts Court and
the Exercise of Judicial Review, 89 Notre Dame L. Rev. 2219 (2014).
50. Nagel, supra note 39, at 926, 943.
51. O’BRIEN, supra note 47, at 363; see also CLARK, supra note 12, at 256–58
(many court-curbing bills are introduced as mere political posturing).
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Justice Roberts or anybody else.52
Finally, any change to the Court that would ostensibly
return the Court to apolitical or neutral decision-making will
necessarily fail. As discussed in the introduction, the Court
always decides cases pursuant to a law-politics dynamic.
Apolitical Supreme Court adjudication is a myth. At best,
some of the proposed stylized expansions of the Court will
leave us with a plethora of five-to-four or eight-to-seven
decisions in politically salient cases (or some other partisan
split, depending on the total number of justices). In fact, even
supposedly neutral decisions are likely to be conservative
because polarization has pushed Republican justices more
rightward than Democratic justices leftward.53

52. For cases suggesting Roberts is the most likely conservative justice to shift
leftward, see Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 140 S. Ct.
1891 (2020) (Roberts opinion holding Trump administration rescission of DACA
violated APA procedural requirements); Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct.
2551 (2019) (Roberts opinion holding Trump administration addition of
citizenship question to census violated APA procedural requirements); see also
Neal Devins & Lawrence Baum, Split Definitive: How Party Polarization Turned
the Supreme Court into A Partisan Court, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 301 (2016)
(emphasizing how polarization has changed the Court). Nevertheless, Roberts’s
supposedly liberal opinions often construct deeply conservative doctrines.
Stephen M. Feldman, Chief Justice Roberts’s Marbury Moment: The Affordable
Care Act Case (NFIB v. Sebelius), 13 WYO. L. REV. 335 (2013). For discussions
rejecting the notion that Roberts is liberal, see Michael C. Dorf, Two Cheers for
the Roberts Concurrence in the Judgment in June Medical, DORF ON LAW (June
29, 2020), https://www.dorfonlaw.org/2020/06/two-cheers-for-roberts-concur
rence-in.html (emphasizing Roberts’s discussion of stare decisis); Hugh Hewitt,
Chief Justice Roberts is no Liberal and the Conservative Judicial Project Isn’t
Dead, WASH. POST (June 19, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/2020/06/19/chief-justice-roberts-is-no-liberal-conservative-judicialproject-isnt-dead/; Leah Litman, It Wasn’t Roberts that Changed this Term. It was
the Cases SCOTUS Heard, SLATE (July 13, 2020), https://www.slate.com/newsand-politics/2020/07/roberts-scotus-conservative-cases.html; Jay Michaelson, No,
Chief Justice John Roberts Isn’t Liberal–He’s a Different Kind of Conservative,
THE DAILY BEAST (June 29, 2020), https://www.thedailybeast.com/no-chiefjustice-roberts-isnt-liberalhes-a-different-kind-of-conservative;
Kimberly
Strawbridge Robinson, Yes, Roberts is in the Middle. No, He’s not a Liberal,
BLOOMBERG LAW (July 9, 2020), https://www.news.bloomberglaw.com/us-lawweek/yes-roberts-is-in-the-middle-no-hes-not-a-liberal.
53. Devins & Baum, supra note 52, at 305–06 (on the Court’s shift rightward);
see also Osita Nwanevu, We’re Not Polarized Enough, THE NEW REPUBLIC (May
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From the Democratic standpoint, when straight-forward
court-packing is compared to the possible alternative
changes to the Court, court-packing is superior in two
important ways.54 First, only court-packing would assure
that an altered Court—a new progressive Roberts Court—
would be able to counter the conservative legacy of the
current Roberts Court. The Court has handed down
numerous
conservative
decisions
and
constructed
conservative constitutional doctrines that, if left untouched,
can lead to conservative results in the Supreme Court and
the lower courts for decades.55 Democrats can guarantee a
change in direction only by establishing a progressive
majority on the Court. In fact, if the current Roberts Court
were to feel threatened, whether by a court-packing or courtcurbing bill, the conservative justices might be motivated to
imminently construct even more and deeper conservative
doctrines before it is too late. For instance, the conservative
justices might reach for an abortion case that would allow
them to overturn Roe v. Wade and eliminate a woman’s right
to choose abortion, or they might reach for a SecondAmendment case that would allow a strengthening of gun
rights.56 Only outright Democratic court-packing could
overcome the current Court’s substantial conservative
legacy.
Second,

the

constitutional

arguments

recognizing

19,
2020),
https://www.newrepublic.com/article/157599/were-not-polarizedenough-ezra-klein-book-review (arguing to accept polarization and working from
there, rather than trying to counter it). One commentator has suggested reducing
the Court to eight justices to avoid partisan decisions. Eric J. Segall, Eight
Justices Are Enough: A Proposal to Improve the United States Supreme Court, 45
PEPP. L. REV. 547 (2018). Of course, in this situation, the Court might be unable
to actually decide politically salient cases.
54. Depending on how one defines court-curbing, it is possible to categorize
court-packing as a type of court-curbing. Clark, supra note 12, at 28, 37–39, 52–
54.
55. See supra note 3 (listing multiple conservative Roberts Court decisions).
56. New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525,
1527–28, 1541–42 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court should
clarify Second-Amendment protections).
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Congress’s power to change the size of the Court—without
any of the stylized alterations suggested by other
commentators—are overwhelmingly strong. Even the
current Court, consistently hostile to congressional
enactments, would find it difficult to invalidate a statute
simply adding justices to the Court.57 Nothing in the
constitutional text limits congressional power to set the size
of the Court.58 Moreover, history reveals that the Court has
fluctuated between a minimum of six and a maximum of ten
seats. Before 1869, Congress enacted statutes changing the
Court’s size seven times, often for political reasons.59 During
one politically volatile decade, the 1860s, Congress increased
the Court to ten seats, dropped it to seven, then settled on
nine. To be sure, besides court-packing, Democrats could
attempt to change the makeup of the Court through one
other clearly constitutional approach: impeachment. The
Constitution allows Congress to impeach and remove
Supreme Court justices and other federal judges.60 But the

57. Michael C. Dorf, How the Written Constitution Crowds Out the
Extraconstitutional Rule of Recognition, in THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE
U.S. CONSTITUTION 69, 74–75, 79 (Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth Einar Himma
eds., 2009) (acknowledging that text and history support the constitutionality of
court-packing).
58. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court . . . .”).
59. TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 214 (“Most of the changes in the Court’s size
were done for good-government reasons, with a soupçon of politics.”). He then
modified this view by acknowledging that multiple changes “were purely
political.” Id. Joshua Braver is a legal scholar who supports court-curbing rather
than court-packing. He argues that prior congressional changes to the Court’s
size were insufficiently political to support any historical argument supporting
court-packing. Joshua Braver, Court-Packing: An American Tradition?, (Harvard
Pub. Law Working Paper No. 19-44), 10, 25–39 https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3483927. One problem with his analysis is a failure
to account for the influence of extreme polarization in today’s political climate as
opposed to the past. See CLARK, supra note 12, at 25–61 (on the politics of
numerous court-curbing episodes); Clark & Kastellec, supra note 12, at 509–10,
524–27 (arguing polarization is likely to influence public opinion of the Court’s
legitimacy). See generally Devins & Baum, supra note 52 (emphasizing that
polarization has changed the Court).
60. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (House power to impeach); U.S. CONST. art. I,
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only Supreme Court justice the House has ever impeached
was the Federalist Samuel Chase in 1804. Impeachment was
based on Chase’s notorious partisanship, yet the Republicancontrolled Senate could not muster the required two-thirds
supermajority to convict him.61 Ever since, the odds of
impeaching a justice solely on political grounds have been
practically nil.
Although the textual and historical arguments for the
constitutionality of court-packing are strong, some
commentators nonetheless argue that history—usually
centered on the 1937 failure to enact President Franklin
Roosevelt’s court-packing plan—has established a norm
against court-packing.62 This argument has three

§ 3, cl. 6 (Senate power to try impeachments).
61. S. JOURNAL, 8th Cong., 2d Sess. 524–27 (1805); ERIK W. AUSTIN, POLITICAL
FACTS OF THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1789, at 50 (1986) (refer to Table 1.20 for a
partisan composition of the United States Senate); STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC
MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 699 (1993); 1 MELVIN I. UROFSKY & PAUL
FINKELMAN, A MARCH OF LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES, FOUNDING–1890, at 200 (2d ed. 2002); GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF
LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789-1815, at 422–25 (2009); James
Haw, Chase, Samuel, in THE YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW
103 (Roger K. Newman ed., 2009); see FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION, supra note 39,
at 70–100 (explaining the Sedition Act controversy). Chase had displayed his
partisanship while conducting several Sedition Act trials of Republicans in 1800.
Later, while riding circuit, Chase charged the Republicans with leading the
nation toward “mobocracy,” and purportedly denigrated President Jefferson
during an 1803 grand jury charge. UROFSKY & FINKELMAN, supra, at 199. Seeking
retribution, House Republicans impeached Chase in early 1804 on eight counts.
Id. Republicans at the time held twenty-one of the thirty-four Senate seats, but
they could not muster the two-thirds supermajority needed to convict on any
count (a slight majority supported conviction on two of the counts). Id. at 200. If
the Senate had convicted, some Republicans were supposedly ready to attempt to
remove Chief Justice John Marshall from office too. Id. 200–01.
62. Dorf, supra note 57, at 74 (suggesting there is a norm or convention
against court-packing); Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss,
Constitutional Conventions, and the Judicial Separation of Powers, 105 GEO. L.J.
255, 321–22 (2017) (without reaching a conclusion, authors recognize that some
commentators would argue that there is a constitutional norm against courtpacking); Grove, Origins, supra note 35, at 512–14; see also STEVEN LEVITSKY &
DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE 130–32 (2018) (arguing norms of
forbearance should preclude court-packing).
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weaknesses.63 First, even if such a norm existed, Mitch
McConnell and the Senate Republicans already shattered it
in 2016 and 2017, when they refused to open confirmation
hearings for Merrick Garland. McConnell and the
Republicans de facto reduced the Court to eight justices for
more than a year. When given a chance to confirm a
conservative Republican, Neil Gorsuch, they returned the
Court to its nine-justice size.64
Second, this anti-court-packing position disregards
much of American history, when Congress was expressly
changing the Court’s size. This slighting of history and
bloated emphasis on the legislative defeat of FDR’s courtpacking plan seems especially tenuous given that leading
contemporary legal scholars and key members of Congress
supported FDR’s plan. Legal realists like Karl Llewellyn,
who had been questioning the Court’s legal formalism for
years, approved of FDR’s approach to the Court.65 More
important from a political standpoint, FDR’s plan had
enough congressional support to give it a reasonable chance
of passage. New Dealers in the House of Representatives
largely supported the plan. While the Senate was more
divided, several key senators, including Democratic Senate
Majority Leader Joe Robinson, Hugo Black of Alabama, and
Robert M. La Follette of Wisconsin, avowed their support,
although the chances for enactment evaporated when
Senator Robinson suddenly passed away.66

63. TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 216–18.
64. Adam Liptak & Matt Flegenheimer, Neil Gorsuch Confirmed by Senate as
Supreme Court Justice, NY TIMES (Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/04/07/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-supreme-court.html.
65. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE Bush 12–13 (1930) (criticizing legal
formalism); see KEVIN J. MCMAHON, RECONSIDERING ROOSEVELT ON RACE 69–73,
111 (2004) (realists supported FDR’s plan).
66. Labor Strife Laid to Supreme Court, NY TIMES, Mar. 25, 1937, at 21,
https://www.nytimes.com/1937/03/25/archives/labor-strife-laid-to-supremecourt-present-unrest-largely-due-to.html (discussing views of Wisconsin Senator
Robert M. La Follette); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN
135 (1995) [hereinafter LEUCHTENBURG, REBORN]; JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER:
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Finally, if a norm against court-packing were to exist, it
would be based on a fallacy, that the Supreme Court should
be a pristine legal institution, free of politics. But political
considerations pervade the makeup of the Court and its
decision-making process.67 If anything, we should
understand the threat of court-packing as an important
aspect of the separation of powers, part of the Constitution’s
checks and balances. The possibility of court-packing gives
the people a political check on the Court for when it departs
too far from the dominant national political alliance.68
Rather than interpreting history, whether the failure to
enact FDR’s plan or other events, as establishing a norm
against court-packing, we should recognize that history
shows the Court engaged in a type of dialogue with Congress,
the President, and the public about the scope of judicial
power.69
FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME COURT 514 (2010); TUSHNET, supra note 2,
at 216 (assessing support in House and Senate); Grove, Origins, supra note 35,
at 509. A recent study concluded that more Americans would have preferred a
constitutional amendment rather than FDR’s statutory court-packing plan.
William D. Blake, The Law: “Justice Under the Constitution, Not Over It”: Public
Perceptions of FDR’s Court-Packing Plan, 49 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 204, 216–17
(2019). Even so, Congress might have passed FDR’s plan if it had been less
ambitious—for instance, seeking an additional two rather than six justices.
LAURA KALMAN, GHOST OF COURT PACKING PAST (Oxford University Press
forthcoming 2021) (book title tentative).
67. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF
U.S. SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FORM WASHINGTON TO BUSH II, at 2–3 (5th
ed. 2008); MITCHEL A. SOLLENBERGER, JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS AND DEMOCRATIC
CONTROLS 12 (2011); see supra text accompanying notes 14–17 (on law and
politics in Supreme Court decision-making).
68. CLARK, supra note 12, at 5–6, 16; BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE
PEOPLE 14 (2009); see infra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing political
science regimist approach, emphasizing the Court’s congruence with the
dominant national political alliance).
69. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 68, at 14–15, 367 (explaining constitutional
meaning as arising from a dialogue between the people and the justices); Stephen
M. Feldman, Republican Revival/Interpretive Turn, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 679, 722–
31 (on dialogue). See generally Stephen M. Feldman, The Persistence of Power
and the Struggle for Dialogic Standards in Postmodern Constitutional
Jurisprudence: Michelman, Habermas, and Civic Republicanism, 81 GEO. L.J.
2243 (1993) (emphasizing importance of dialogue in constitutional
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II. SUPREME COURT LEGITIMACY AND COURT-PACKING
Even if the Democrats’ best means for changing the
Court is straight-forward court-packing, should the
Democrats hesitate? Lacking the power of either the purse
or the sword, the Court depends on its sociological
legitimacy.70 Without sufficiently widespread public
approval of the Court as an institution, the Court’s authority
to decide disputes will dissipate.71 What if Democratic courtpacking might cause many people to lose faith in the Court’s
legitimacy?
Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt’s important recent
book, How Democracies Die, bolsters this criticism of courtpacking. Similar to Robert A. Dahl and other post-World War
II democratic theorists, they argue that democracy depends
on the preservation of certain cultural (democratic) norms,
including
“norms
of
forbearance”
that
preclude
“constitutional hardball.”72 From their perspective, courtjurisprudence).
70. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 199–243 (2d
ed. 1986).
71. FALLON, supra note 12, at 21–24. This emphasis on the Court’s sociological
legitimacy resonates with a political science approach linking Supreme Court
decision making to regime politics. In a seminal empirical study of cases where
the Court invalidated congressional statutes, Robert A. Dahl observed that,
contrary to common assumptions, the Court did not protect minorities from
majoritarian overreaching. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The
Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 284 (1957). Instead,
the Court usually decided cases in harmony with the interests and values of that
dominant political alliance or regime. Id. at 293. An example is Brown v. Board
of Education, which held unconstitutional de jure racial segregation in public
schools. 347 U.S. 483, 493–95 (1954). Regimists maintain that Brown did not
show the Court boldly championing the rights of a black Americans in the face of
white majoritarian pressures. Dahl, supra at 294. Instead, the Court in Brown
followed the interests and values of a dominant national political coalition or
regime that favored the eradication of Jim Crow. Terri Peretti, Constructing the
State Action Doctrine, 1940-1990, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 273, 288–90 (2010).
White southerners who supported legalized racial segregation had become
national outliers; the Court forced them to acquiesce to more mainstream views,
as understood from a national vantage. Id. at 298–99.
72. LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 62, at 8–9, 97–117. Mark Tushnet is
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packing would contravene such norms of forbearance and
lead to “democratic breakdown.”73 For that reason, autocrats
such as Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey and Viktor Orban
in Hungary have sought to pack and weaponize the courts,
using the law to protect themselves while attacking
opponents.74 In such situations, the people typically lose
faith in the courts as well as other democratic institutions.
Court-packing, in short, is likely to contribute to the
degradation and eventual destruction of democracy and its
institutions. In our contemporary United States, then, courtpacking could undermine the Court’s institutional (or
sociological) legitimacy.75
Four reasons undermine this objection to court-packing.
First, we should be wary about attaching too much
significance to public opinion about the Supreme Court. Polls
leave much ambiguity regarding public perceptions of the
Court. Some polls show that Americans hold wildly diverse
opinions about the Court, though the poll questions rarely
distinguish between public perceptions of the Court as an
institution and perceptions of specific and recent Court
decisions.76 To be certain, many polls suggest that most
usually credited with coining the term, constitutional hardball. See generally
Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 523 (2004). For
Dahl and other postwar theorists see ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC
THEORY 4, 143 (1956); ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY 48–
49 (1985); ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 172 (1989); see also
DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN POLITICS 162 (1953) (emphasizing
a “genuine community of our values”); DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL
PROCESS 129, 138, 512–13 (2d ed. 1971) (emphasizing the rules of the game for
democracy).
73. LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 62, at 127.
74. Kosař & Šipulová, supra note 4, at 134–35.
75. LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 62, at 130–32. Court-packing, in other
words, could contribute to democratic or constitutional “degradation” or “rot.”
FELDMAN, FAILING, supra note 2, at 231 (discussing degradation). See generally
Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Crisis and Constitutional Rot, 77 MD. L. REV. 147
(2017) (discussing rot).
76. Bruce Drake & John Gramlich, 5 Facts About the Supreme Court, PEW
RESEARCH CENTER FACTANK (Oct. 7, 2019) http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2016/09/26/5-facts-about-the-supreme-court/; Supreme Court, GALLUP,
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Americans know and care little about the Court. A 2018 CSPAN survey showed fewer than one-half of likely American
voters could name at least one Supreme Court justice; the
same was true in a 2009 survey.77 One 2016 poll revealed
that almost 10 percent of college graduates believed the
television judge, Judge Judy, sat on the Court; the
percentage rose to 13.1 percent when the poll expanded
beyond college graduates.78 A 2015 poll found that 32 percent
of Americans could not identify the Supreme Court as a
branch of the United States government, while 28 percent
believed 5-4 Court rulings were “sent back either to Congress
for reconsideration or to the lower courts for a decision.”79
My own (anecdotal) experience suggests the need for
skepticism when evaluating public perceptions of the Court.
Shortly after Justice Scalia’s death, I happened to go to my
dentist, an articulate man in his mid-30s and obviously a
graduate of college and dental school. Knowing I am a law
professor, he disclosed that he believed Scalia had been a
“great” justice. By coincidence, I had recently published an
article on the history of originalism, so with trepidation I
asked if he would be interested in reading my article.80 My
dentist’s response? He had never heard of originalism. At
that point, I decided not to ask him why he admired Scalia.
Quite possibly, my dentist had responded to “partisan source
cues.”81 Knowing his family of origin, I suspect that he was
politically conservative, and conservative commentators and
http://www.gallup.com/poll/4732/supreme-court.aspx (last visited Mar. 6, 2017).
77. Robert Green & Adam Rosenblatt, Supreme Court Survey: Agenda of Key
Findings, C-SPAN/PSB (Aug. 2018); Penn, Schoen & Berland Assocs., C-SPAN
Supreme Court Survey (July 9, 2009).
78. AM. COUNCIL
2016).

OF

TRS. & ALUMNI, A CRISIS

IN

CIVIC EDUCATION 19 (Jan.

79. Press Release, The Annenberg Pub. Policy Ctr. of the Univ. of Pa., Is There
a Constitutional Right to Own a Home or a Pet? Many Americans Don’t Know
(Sept. 16, 2015).
80. Stephen M. Feldman, Constitutional Interpretation and History: New
Originalism or Eclecticism?, 28 BYU J. PUB. L. 283 (2014).
81. Clark & Kastellec, supra note 12, at 507.
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political leaders had long heaped praise on Scalia’s
jurisprudence. Such source cues can apparently engender
concern for as well as support for the Court. Exit polls from
the 2016 presidential election revealed that 21 percent of
voters named Supreme Court appointments as the most
important factor in determining their votes, a greater
percentage than in the 2008 election. Even so, prior to the
2016 election, surveys suggested that Supreme Court
appointments was only the ninth most important issue.82
In any event, recent political science studies suggest
caution when evaluating public knowledge about the Court.
Evidence shows that many people have general knowledge
about the Court—for instance, that justices are appointed
rather than elected—while those same people know few
specific details, except when the details directly affect
them.83 My dentist illustrates this phenomenon: He knew
something about the Court—in fact, he knew that Scalia had
been a justice—but he did not know the details of Scalia’s
originalist jurisprudence.84 Most important, perhaps, this
widespread general knowledge of the Court entails strong
diffuse support for the Court as an institution rather than
specific support for particular case decisions. This diffuse
support or loyalty to the Court is grounded on, in the words
of James L. Gibson and Gregory A. Caldeira, “broader

82. Top Voting Issues in 2016 Election, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (July 7, 2016),
https://www.people-press.org/2016/07/07/4-top-voting-issues-in-2016-election/;
see also Election 2016, Exit Polls, CNN POLITICS, http://www.cnn.com/
election/results/exit-polls (last updated Nov. 23, 2016); NBC News Exit Poll:
Future Supreme Court Appointments Important Factor in Presidential Voting,
NBC NEWS, (Nov. 8, 2016), http://www.nbcnews.com/card/nbc-news-exit-pollfuture-supreme-court-appointments-important-factor-n680381. On the politics of
individual viewpoints, see generally Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein,
Institutional Flip-Flops, 94 TEX. L. REV. 485 (2016) (arguing that vigorous
institutional commitments—for example, to federalism—change when necessary
to fit one’s political ideology).
83. GIBSON & CALDEIRA, CITIZENS, supra note 12, at 17–35.
84. Stephen M. Feldman, Justice Scalia and the Originalist Fallacy, in THE
CONSERVATIVE REVOLUTION OF ANTONIN SCALIA 189 (Howard Schweber & David
A. Schultz eds., 2018).
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commitments to democratic institutions and processes, and
more generally in knowledge of the role of the judiciary in
the American democratic system.”85
The importance of this diffuse support for the Court
leads to a second reason not to be overly worried about public
perceptions of court-packing. Regardless of how much people
know and care about the Court, we should not condescend to
those who do know and care. The crux of the objection to
court-packing—that it would cause the public to lose faith in
the Court—is grounded on an assumption that the public (or
that segment of the public with reasonable knowledge of the
Court) could not handle the truth about judicial decision
making—that the justices’ political views matter in the
Court’s decisions. But if the law-politics dichotomy is a myth,
if the Court instead decides pursuant to a law-politics
dynamic, then must we still propagate the myth for fear the
people need its comfort? If God is dead—or never existed—
must we nonetheless encourage the people to keep praying?
If so, then we might as well as renounce democracy. Tell the
people the truth, as we understand it, and let the people
decide. Sociological legitimacy might even increase if people
understood the truth, that Supreme Court decision making
is politics writ small.86
In fact, political science studies suggest that the public’s
diffuse support for the Court is resilient, sustained by “a
reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will.”87 A “positivity

85. GIBSON & CALDEIRA, CITIZENS, supra note 12, at 61. For the distinction
between diffuse and specific support, see id. at 39–40; CLARK, supra note 12, at
17.
86. A majority of Americans appear to believe in a type of legal realism to
some degree. Gibson & Caldeira, Realism, supra note 12, at 206–08. That is,
“[m]ost [Americans] believe that judges have discretion and that judges make
discretionary decisions on the basis of ideology and values . . . .” Id. at 207–08.
While Bartles and Johnston criticize Gibson and Caldeira on other matters, they
agree that many Americans accept a type of legal realism. CURBING, supra note
12, at 69–70.
87. GIBSON & CALDEIRA, CITIZENS, supra note 12, at 39 (quoting DAVID
EASTON, A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL LIFE 273 (1965)). For studies generally
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bias” helps the Court maintain this good will and
institutional legitimacy. According to positivity (bias) theory,
“anything that causes people to pay attention to courts—
even controversies— winds up reinforcing institutional
legitimacy through exposure to the legitimizing symbols
associated with law and courts.”88 Even when the Court
issues a decision contrary to an individual’s personal views,
that individual is unlikely to lose faith in the Court. If
anything, when news of Court activities draws an
individual’s attention, then that attention (to the Court) will
likely reinforce the individual’s positive views of the
institution. In a sense, the more one knows about the Court,
the more one is likely to find its decisions legitimate (the
opposite is true for Congress).89
To be sure, the Court’s legitimacy is not bulletproof: It
depends on a perception that the Court is not merely another
political institution. For instance, a confirmation battle in
the Senate is unlikely to damage the Court’s legitimacy, but
if widely viewed advertisements (related to the confirmation
battle) attack the Court as purely political, then diffuse
support for the Court is likely to diminish.90 Thus, while a
politically salient Supreme Court decision might offend some
Americans based on political ideology,91 a lack of specific
supporting the resilience of the Court’s diffuse support, see GIBSON & CALDEIRA,
CITIZENS, supra note 12 at 64–66, 69–71, 88–95; Badas, supra note 12;
Christenson & Glick, supra note 12, at 409; Gibson & Caldeira, Realism, supra
note 12; Gibson & Nelson, Reconsidering, supra note 12; Gibson & Nelson,
Legitimacy, supra note 12; Gibson et al., supra note 12. Bartles and Johnston
challenge the conclusion that the Court enjoys a reservoir of good will. CURBING,
supra note 12, at 64–67, 89. Still, they admit that trust in the Court remains
high. Id. at 70–71. Ultimately, they argue the Court does not lack support, but it
is not as deep and wide as others maintain. Id. at 248–49.
88. GIBSON & CALDEIRA, CITIZENS, supra note 12, at 3.
89. Id. at 7–10, 121–23; Gibson & Nelson, Reconsidering, supra note 12, at
612–15 (reconfirming positivity theory).
90. CLARK, supra note 12, at 18; GIBSON & CALDEIRA, CITIZENS, supra note 12,
at 61–62, 119–20, 124–25; Gibson & Caldeira, Realism, supra note 12, at 199–
200; Gibson & Nelson, Reconsidering, supra note 12, at 595, 604–05, 612.
91. Clark & Kastellec, supra note 12, at 505–06, 510–11.
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support for that decision does not translate into a meaningful
reduction of diffuse support. Only those Americans who
already reject the Court as an institution—those individuals
who have not developed a favorable attitude and good will
toward the Court—are likely to denigrate it because of a
small number of specific decisions. For the most part, the
Court is able to maintain its institutional legitimacy despite
“the ideological and partisan cross-currents that so wrack
contemporary American politics.”92 Even so, sustained
disappointment with the Court’s decisions over the long
term, especially in politically salient cases, can weaken
diffuse support for the Court. To take one example, diffuse
support for the Court diminished among black Americans
during the post-Warren Court years (consider the Burger,
Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts’ consistent hostility toward
race-based affirmative action).93
Significantly, the people’s diffuse support for and loyalty
to the Court does not depend on the myth of pure law—that
is, the myth of the law-politics dichotomy. To the contrary,
many Americans seem to understand that Supreme Court
92. Gibson & Nelson, Legitimacy, supra note 12, at 173. Gibson and Nelson
criticize the conclusions of Brandon L. Bartels & Christopher D. Johnston, who
had argued that an individual’s political ideology determined his or her diffuse
support for the Court. Bartels & Johnston, supra note 12, at 196–97. Gibson and
Nelson add, though, that for a small group of people, ideological disagreement
can affect perceptions of the Court’s legitimacy. Gibson & Nelson, Reconsidering,
supra note 12, at 613. They define legal realists as those individuals who
“understand that Supreme Court decisions are based on the justices’ ideologies,
values, and opinions on the issues at litigation.” Id. at 597. Then they conclude
that a subset of legal realists are most likely to be influenced by perceived
ideological differences from the Court: namely, those legal realists who measure
highest or strongest (on the measures for belief in realism) and who
simultaneously do not view the Court as just another political institution. Id. at
607–09. Bartles and Johnston have responded and elaborated their emphasis on
political ideology. CURBING, supra note 12.
93. CLARK, supra note 12, at 18; Caldeira & Gibson, Etiology, supra note 12,
at 640 & n.7; Gibson & Caldeira, Blacks, supra note 12, at 1140–41; Glennon &
Strother, supra note 12, at 243. For decisions invalidating race-based affirmative
action programs, see generally Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch.
Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007); Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200
(1995); Univ. of Calif. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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decision making entails a combination of law and politics—
the law-politics dynamic. As Gibson and Caldeira conclude:
“[T]he American people seem to accept that judicial
decisionmaking (sic) can be discretionary and grounded in
ideologies, but also principled and sincere. Judges differ from
ordinary politicians in acting sincerely . . . .”94 This insight
into the Court’s institutional legitimacy has enormous
implications for Democratic court-packing. Although a courtpacking controversy would undoubtedly entail debates over
the Court’s politically-charged decisions, the Court’s overall
diffuse support would probably remain relatively stable.
Most likely, in these hyper-polarized times, individuals’
political ideologies—leaning Republican or Democratic—
would influence reactions to a Democratic court-packing
plan. Republicans of course would oppose it, but many
Democrats would likely support it, especially if Democratic
politicians emphasized that they sought to return the Court
to sincere and principled decision making.95 To the extent
that individual views of the Court’s legitimacy might change
in response to a court-packing plan, partisan shifts would
likely cancel each other out. In the end, despite divergent
views of the court-packing plan, the overall legitimacy of the
Court itself would likely be sustained (or even grow) whether
because of a positivity bias favoring the Court or a
94. Gibson & Caldeira, Realism, supra note 12, at 214. “[M]any Americans
believe that the Court is influenced by both political and legal considerations.”
CURBING, supra note 12, at 70.
95. Clark & Kastellec, supra note 12, at 525 (political ideology can influence
individual reactions to issues related to diffuse support—such as court-curbing
measures—even if diffuse support for the Court itself remains relatively
resilient). Based on a survey experiment focused on packing the lower federal
courts (not the Supreme Court), Amanda Driscoll and Michael J. Nelson
concluded that Democratic court-packing would be unlikely to harm the
Democratic party. Democratic voters would likely support Democratic courtpacking, especially if there were apolitical justifications given (such as managing
the court’s caseload). Amanda Driscoll & Michael J. Nelson, These Two
Arguments Make Americans Less Opposed to Court Packing, WASH. POST (Mar.
27, 2019) (based on the following study: Amanda Driscoll & Michael J.Nelson,
The Costs and Benefits of Court Curbing: Experimental Evidence from the United
States (2018)).
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widespread Democratic (policy) opposition to the Roberts
Court’s conservatism (as well as Democratic abhorrence
toward recent Republican Senate maneuvers, including the
rushed confirmation of Barrett, which resulted in an ironclad
six-justice conservative bloc).96
Hence, a third reason not to worry about the effect of
court-packing on the Court’s legitimacy: Our views of courtpacking should be based on the political turn necessary for
court-packing to be considered in the first place. In other
words, if the Republicans retain control of the presidency or
the Senate or both in the 2020 election, then the Democrats
will be unable to try court-packing in 2021. Only if and when
the Democrats sweep, gaining control of the presidency plus
both houses of Congress, can the Democrats even attempt to
pack the Court. Whenever a Democratic sweep occurs,
whether in 2020 or subsequently, the thrust of public opinion
might have shifted sufficiently in a progressive direction so
as to make court-packing publicly palatable.
To be clear, I have not attempted to delineate a specific

96. CHRISTENSON & GLICK, supra note 12, at 416. See CURBING, supra note 12,
at 18–28 (emphasizing political ideology as the key to securing support for courtcurbing); GIBSON & CALDEIRA, CITIZENS, supra note 12, at 3 (emphasizing
positivity bias); TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 219–21 (questioning whether
Democratic court-packing would undermine the Court’s legitimacy). Ironically, if
Democratic court-packing were to engender a threat to the Court’s legitimacy, it
would likely arise from hyperbolic Republican attacks emphasizing the
undermining of the Court’s legitimacy rather than from the court-packing itself.
CLARK, supra note 12, at 18; GIBSON & CALDEIRA, CITIZENS, supra note 12, at 61–
62, 119–20, 124–25. For a recent empirical survey regarding potential courtcurbing proposals—albeit taken before Justice Ginsburg’s death—see LEE
EPSTEIN ET AL., PUBLIC RESPONSE TO PROPOSALS TO REFORM THE SUPREME COURT
(2020). With regard to empirical studies supporting positivity theory, while some
surveys asked about confidence in the Court’s leaders, more recent surveys ask
multiple questions that indirectly manifest support (or disdain) for the Court. See
generally James L. Gibson et al., Measuring Attitudes Toward the United States
Supreme Court, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 354 (2003). Some of those questions typically
relate to support for court-curbing, yet those questions are always supplemented
by other questions. Id. at Table 2, Appendix B; Gibson & Nelson, Reconsidering,
supra note 12, at Appendix A. Thus, a high level of support for the Court should
not be equated with a necessary opposition to court-curbing, much less courtpacking.
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set of criteria that must be satisfied to justify court-packing.
To the contrary, the determination must and will be made
politically. The Court itself, of course, plays a significant role
in this political determination. Have the justices been
deciding cases that politically depart from a national political
alliance? Most likely, “abusive judicial review”—issuing
decisions denigrating and weakening rather than protecting
and strengthening democracy—would provoke public
concern.97 Yet even abusive judicial review would not be a
prerequisite to court-packing; rather, in a still-functioning
democracy, the totality of political circumstances would be
determinative. In the end, as positivity theory suggests,
sustained disappointment with the Court’s decisions,
especially in politically salient cases, would weaken diffuse
(political) support for the Court.98 Consequently, if and when
the Democrats sweep, Democratic voters would likely have
soured on the conservative Roberts Court—which after all
followed the conservative Rehnquist Court. In fact, although
the Democrats have won the popular vote in six out of the
last seven presidential elections, a conservative bloc of
justices has controlled the Court for nearly thirty years.99 A
Democratic sweep, quite possibly, would manifest in part
public support to “rein in” the conservative justices of the
Roberts Court.100 Historical evidence shows that, in the
1930s, New Deal voters generally supported FDR’s courtpacking plan.101 More recently, during the decade of the
2010s, at least ten states attempted court-packing in their
respective state judiciaries, with two states being

97. David Landau & Rosalind Dixon, Abusive Judicial Review: Courts Against
Democracy, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1313, 1317 (2020).
98. CLARK, supra note 12, at 18; Caldeira & Gibson, Etiology, supra note 12,
at 640 & n.7; Gibson & Caldeira, Blacks, supra note 12, at 1140–41.
99. Klarman, supra note 4.
100. CLARK, supra note 12, at 4.
101. Badas, supra note 12 at 392, Table 2; see Blake, supra note 66 and
accompanying text.
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successful.102 If the people vote for a Democratic Congress
and president, they very well might support a move to pack
the Court.
Without question, in the political atmosphere after a
Democratic sweep, a Democratic court-packing plan would
contribute to the ongoing dialogue over Supreme Court
power and decision making. As a matter of political strategy,
congressional Democrats would not need to falsely celebrate
the law-politics dichotomy—the myth of pure law—but they
would likely benefit by emphasizing that the current Court
has departed from principled decision making.103 The result
of a Democratic court-packing plan would likely be an
increase in the size of the Court, but another possible result
would be the shifting of one or more justices to a more
progressive outlook, though such a shift seems unlikely, as
mentioned above.104 Either way, the Court would be forced to
bend to the political realities: If and when the Democrats
electorally sweep Congress and the presidency, the Court
will need to bend to Democratic political power. That
necessity, that reality, is baked into the checks and balances
of our tripartite national government. And history amply
illustrates the operation of those constitutional grants of
power to Congress and the president in the nomination and
confirmation processes as well as in setting the size of the
Court.105
The final reason not to reject court-packing for fear of
public reaction paradoxically rests on a concern for the
102. Marin K. Levy, Packing and Unpacking State Courts, 61 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1121, 1135–45 (2020).
103. E.g., Brief, supra note 3, at 11–12; see CURBING, supra note 12, at 19
(politically motivated individuals would likely legitimize support for courtcurbing with process-based claims).
104. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (explaining that Roberts is
unlikely to shift left).
105. Clark & Kastellec, supra note 12, at 524–27 (emphasizing the Court’s
sensitivity to cues about its power). In a similar vein, Clark underscores “the
interaction among the public, Congress, and the Court” in understanding judicial
power and independence. CLARK, supra note 12, at 15.
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public. If we are truly concerned with public opinion, we
should be worried about the integrity of our democratic
process—through which public opinion is most clearly
expressed and manifested. Yet the conservative justices on
the Roberts Court have consistently denigrated democratic
government (while protecting wealth and the economic
marketplace).106 Whether in relation to voting rights,107
gerrymandering,108 respect for Congress’s representation of
the people,109 or economic equality in political campaigns,110
the Roberts Court has refused to bolster democracy. If we
106. See, e.g., Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183,
2211 (2020) (holding requirement that CFPB’s director was removable only for
cause violated separation of powers); Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552,
562, 580 (2011) (holding that legislative prohibition on pharmaceutical data
mining violated free expression); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558
U.S. 310, 364–65, 371 (2010) (holding that corporate campaign spending limits
violated free expression). The early Roberts Court ranked as the most probusiness Supreme Court since World War II. J. Mitchell Pickerill & Cornell W.
Clayton, The Roberts Court and Economic Issues in an Era of Polarization, 67
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 693, 693–94 (2017). The five conservatives ranked among
the top ten justices most favorable to business from the 1946 through the 2011
terms. Id. at 697–98. Alito and Roberts stood first and second on the list. Id. at
714; see also J. Mitchell Pickerill, Is the Roberts Court Business Friendly? Is the
Pope Catholic?, in BUSINESS AND THE ROBERTS COURT 35 (Jonathan H. Adler ed.,
2016) (empirical study concluding Roberts Court is business friendly though it
continues a trend starting years ago with Nixon’s appointees); Corey Ciocchetti,
The Constitution, the Roberts Court, and Business, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV.
385, 460, 472 (2013); Lee Epstein et al., How Business Fares in the Supreme
Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431, 1449–51, 1472–73 (2013).
107. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2634 (2013) (invalidating key
provision in Voting Rights Act); Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S.
181, 209 (2008) (holding states could constitutionally require individuals to show
photo identification before voting).
108. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2508 (2019) (holding that
political gerrymandering was a nonjusticiable political question).
109. Trump v. Mazars, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2036 (2020) (holding that House could
not subpoena President Trump’s income tax records); Holder, 133 S. Ct. at 2634
(2013) (invalidating key provision in Voting Rights Act because of inadequate
congressional findings); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566,
2608 (2012) (holding that the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate was
beyond Congress’s commerce power and that the ACA’s Medicaid expansion was
beyond the spending power).
110. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 364–65, 371 (holding that restrictions on
corporate campaign spending violate free expression).
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must choose between protecting the Court (from courtpacking) and protecting democratic government (from the
Roberts Court’s conservative decision making), the choice is
clear. We must preserve and enhance democracy. If the
Court
demonstrates
hostility
toward
democratic
government, then it is the Court that must be sacrificed.111
But in reality, the Court need not be sacrificed. To the
degree that Levitsky and Ziblatt argue, in How Democracies
Die, that court-packing is necessarily a tool of autocrats that
will undermine our democratic norms, they overstate their
case. Unquestionably, Court-packing can be useful for an
autocrat, but court-packing alone does not transform a duly
elected president into an autocrat. If Joe Biden were to
become president and the Democrats were to pack the Court,
Biden would not instantly become an autocrat. It would
depend on the functioning of the Court as well as Biden’s
other actions.112 And even after court-packing, the Court
111. On current threats to democratic government see TOM GINSBURG & AZIZ
Z. HUQ, HOW TO SAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 1–5, 237–45 (2018); RICHARD
L. HASEN, THE VOTING WARS 10 (2012); LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 62, at
206–12; Richard L. Hasen, The 2016 U.S. Voting Wars: From Bad to Worse, 26
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 629, 654–55 (2018). On the Court as a threat to
democracy see FELDMAN, FAILING, supra note 2, at 199–226. It should be noted
that politics and democracy answer the common concern that Democratic courtpacking will provoke a later round of Republican court-packing—tit-for-tat courtpacking. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (explaining the tit-for-tat
concern). If and when the Democrats sweep, then the Republican party will
inevitably go through a period of transformation. Meanwhile, a Democraticcontrolled national government would be able to protect voting rights to a greater
degree than ever before—especially if the Democrats also pack the Court, so the
conservative justices cannot block democracy-enhancing legislation. If,
subsequently, the Republicans ever control Congress and the presidency, it will
likely be a different Republican party from the ultra-polarizing and reactionary
Republican party of today. See generally THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J.
ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS (2012) (arguing that Republican and
Democratic parties have not been equally guilty in breaking norms—Republicans
have been far worse); Joseph Fishkin & David E. Pozen, Asymmetric
Constitutional Hardball, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 915 (2018) (arguing that
constitutional hardball has been asymmetric, with the Republicans pushing more
strongly against traditional norms). That new (and improved) Republican party
might not want to engage in tit-for-tat court-packing.
112. See Kosař & Šipulová, supra note 4, at 156–57 (arguing against court-
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should continue to decide cases as it has always done, in
accord with a law-politics dynamic, as discussed in the
introduction. A thirteen-justice Court should be, in this
regard, no different than a nine-justice Court. The justices
should continue to sincerely interpret the relevant legal texts
(with politics writ small working in the background). In the
end, Levitsky and Ziblatt fail to account for situations where
a high court, such as the United States Supreme Court, itself
threatens democratic government. The relationship between
court-packing and democracy necessarily turns on the
specific factual circumstances surrounding the court-packing
and the subsequent actions of the reconstituted court. In
1937, when political pressure, whether from FDR’s courtpacking plan or otherwise, induced the Court to shift its
jurisprudential position, FDR and the New Dealers did not
seek to undermine democratic government.113 To the
packing in general but acknowledging that it can be legitimate in certain
circumstances).
113. Historians have wondered whether Justice Owen Roberts and the Court
changed direction because of political pressure—especially because of the threat
of court-packing. See, e.g., BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT:
THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998) (emphasizing legal
doctrine); LEUCHTENBURG, REBORN, supra note 66 (emphasizing political
pressure). As some have noted, even though the Court issued its key decision in
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), after FDR publicly
announced his court-packing plan, Roberts and the other justices had already
met in conference to discuss the case, on December 19, 1936, and cast their votes,
before the president’s announcement. Regardless, to think the justices were
oblivious to the political rumors that had been swirling around Washington for
weeks stretches credulity. Almost three weeks before the case conference, the
New York Times reported that the administration and Congress were considering
possible legislative means for controlling the Court. Roosevelt to Quit in 1940,
Creel Says, NY TIMES, Nov. 30, 1936, at 4. According to the Times article,
advocates for change realized “Congress can enlarge the Supreme Court,
increasing the number of justices from nine to twelve or fifteen.” Id. The Times
report was not anomalous. For a couple of years, dating back to early-1935, the
press had been reporting similar rumors on a regular basis. Barely a week before
the Court’s December 19 conference, the Washington Post reported an Institute
of Public Opinion poll concluding that 41 percent of Americans favored “a
constitutional amendment to curtail the power of the Supreme Court.” Highlights
of Today’s Polls, WASH. POST. Dec. 13, 1936, at B1; CUSHMAN, supra, at 18;
LEUCHTENBURG, REBORN, supra note 66, at 114–31, 143, 310–11, n.17; see also
SHESOL, supra note 66, at 96 (discussing earlier reports of administration
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contrary, they sought to have the Court accept democracy
and the legislative outcomes of the democratic process.114
Given this, if Congress had enacted FDR’s plan, he would not
have instantly been transformed from a popularly-elected
president into an autocrat.115
III. CONCLUSION
In the current political climate, many progressives want
to change the Supreme Court. Straightforward courtpacking has many advantages over other proposed changes,
including court-curbing measures, impositions of term
limits, and stylized expansions. Yet, many observers fear
court-packing as the most extreme of the possible changes
and, as such, the most likely to undermine the Court’s
sociological legitimacy—the public support for the Court as a
judicial institution. Yet, recent political science research
shows that, empirically, the American people’s diffuse
support for the Court is resilient. In fact, this positivity bias
protects the Court sufficiently so that court-packing is
unlikely to threaten this support to any serious degree.

discussions on controlling the Court). By the end of January 1937, Washington
was buzzing with rumors about a pending Roosevelt announcement concerning
the Court. Significantly, a statistical study concluded that political pressure
pushed Owen Roberts to shift temporarily leftward, but the pressure arose
largely from FDR’s landslide victory rather than the court-packing plan itself.
Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, Did a Switch in Time Save Nine?, 2 J. OF LEGAL
ANALYSIS 69, 69–72 (2010).
114. MCMAHON, supra note 65, at 14 (FDR pushed the Court to accept a “more
inclusive democracy”); Landau & Dixon, supra note 97 at 1383–84 (FDR did not
attack democracy). On the ambiguity of court-packing in relation to democracy,
see GINSBURG & HUQ, supra note 111, at 4, 218–22; Aziz Huq & Tom Ginsburg,
How to Lose A Constitutional Democracy, 65 UCLA L. REV. 78, 84–86 (2018);
Keck, supra note 4.
115. Of course, many conservatives believe the Court’s 1937 change amounted
to the abandonment or destruction of the American constitutional system.
Richard A. Epstein, The Mistakes of 1937, 11 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 5 (1988);
Douglas H. Ginsburg, Delegation Running Riot, 1 REGULATION 83, 84 (1995)
(reviewing DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS
ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993)) (arguing for a return to the socalled Constitution-in-exile).
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Is this entire discussion of court-packing moot, however,
because the Democratic nominee, Joe Biden, has already
opposed court-packing?116 In other words, even if the
moderate Biden is elected and becomes president in January
2021—and the Democrats gain control of both houses of
Congress—is the possibility of court-packing already dead
because of Biden’s opposition? No, for three reasons. First,
Democrats in Congress might pass a court-packing bill, and
Biden, when confronted with the bill, might acquiesce to the
wishes of his party. Second, and related to the first point,
Biden’s vice president (and other advisers) might persuade
Biden to change his position and support court-packing.
Finally, if (or when) the Roberts Court, as currently
constituted, starts invalidating Democratic statutes passed
under Biden’s watch, the Court itself might provoke him to
recognize the need for court-packing. Biden’s campaign
statements have suggested a willingness to shift in more
progressive directions when necessary or useful, so he might
ultimately be persuaded to accept or even advocate for courtpacking, especially when he realizes that it will not weaken
the Court’s public legitimacy.117

116. Shaw, supra note 11.
117. For instance, Biden recently expressed openness toward the elimination
of the Senate filibuster, although he previously had opposed such a change.
Cohen, supra note 31.

